COMPENSATION OF PERSONS ERRONEOUSLY
CONFINED BY THE STATE
In the summer of 1966, a university professor's wife was raped
in Philadelphia. Gordon J. Ragan was convicted and imprisoned on
the strength of an identification by the victim. After serving three
years, Ragan was released when another young man, to whom Ragan
bore startling resemblance, confessed to the crime.1 Ragan's response
to his release was: "[I]f it happened to me it must have happened to
thousands of other people." 2
In 1932, Professor Edwin Borchard presented case studies of 65
similar victims of erroneous confinements by the state.' He remarked
then that "[I]t seems strange that so little attention has been given to
one of the most flagrant of all publicly imposed wrongs-the plight
of the innocent victim of unjust conviction in criminal cases." , Professor Borchard's observation could be made with equal force today:
in the overwhelming number of cases no adequate relief is available to
those, like Gordon Ragan, erroneously confined by state criminal
processes.
Erroneous criminal conviction is not the only route to unjust
incarceration. Errors in the civil commitment context are adequately
suggested by the report of the recent release of Catherine Sinschuck, a
Ukrainian woman believed insane and confined in the Philadelphia
Hospital at Byberry for forty-eight years-largely because she could
not speak English.' Redress for victims of erroneous civil commitment
is also generally unavailable or inadequate.
Tremendous strides have been made in recent decades toward
protecting the rights of one accused of a crime. More recently,
attention has focused on such matters as the remedies available to
persons injured while imprisoned, 6 and compensation for victims of
crime 7 and mob violence.' Protective rules have been developed to
guarantee the rights of persons civilly confined through exclusively
I See Phila. Sunday Bulletin, Feb. 16, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
21d

3 E. BORCHARD,

CONVICTING THE INNOCENT

(1932).

4 Id. 375.
5
See Phila. Evening Bulletin, Dec. 18, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
6
See, e.g., Note, Remedies Available to Penal Inmates for Injuries Received
While Imarcerated, 34 IND. L.J. 609 (1959).
7 See, e.g., Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 444 (1964); Rothstein, State Compensation for Criminally Inflicted
Injuries,44 TEXAS L. REV. 38 (1965); Comment, Compensation for Victims of Crime,
33 U. CL L. REV. 531 (1966).
SSee, e.g., Note, Municipal Tort Liability: Statutory Liability of Municipalities

for Damage Caused by Mobs and Riots, 50 CoaRNEL L.Q. 699 (1965).
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civil proceedings ' or following acquittal of a criminal charge.' 0
for those erroneously confined by the power of the state-that is,
fined following a legitimate criminal or civil proceeding marred
mistake of fact " -the opportunities for redress remain meager.

Yet
conby a
The

interests of these victims have received only passing attention

since

12

Professor Borchard's writings.' 3
This Comment will urge that when the exercise of state power
results in an erroneous confinement, the government whose police
power made such confinement possible should to the extent feasible
redress the victim's injury, regardless of whether any government
agent has played a culpable role. Recommended is redress in the form
of monetary compensation, based on a "strict enterprise liability"
rather than an "eminent domain" theory. Both rationales for compensation rest on the identical premise that erroneous confinements are
costs of operation to be borne by the system; '" but the eminent domain

9
See, e.g., Comment, Due Process for A ll-ConstitutionalStandards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 633 (1967) ; Comment, The
New Mental Health Codes: Safeguards in Compulsory Commitment and Release,
61 Nw. U.L. REv. 977 (1967).
10 See, e.g., Comment, Commitment Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity
and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 924 (1968).
11 An individual who in fact satisfies the substantive standards for a valid conviction or commitment, yet is subsequently released because of an error in applying
one of the standards of confinement, would not be considered the victim of an erroneous
confinement. Standards usually procedural in nature may have been misapplied, but
the individual satisfied the substantive elements for confinement-he committed the
crime for the purposes of legal proof. For example, a man released on a constitutional
ground-such as admission of illegally seized evidence at trial-would not be considered a victim of an erroneous confinement if he in fact had committed the offense
charged.
12 For an abbreviated statement of several statutes designed to provide monetary
relief for persons erroneously convicted, see Note, PostreleaseRemedies for Wrongful
Conviction, 74 HARv. L. IEv. 1615, 1626-27 (1961). The Note emphasizes remedies
designed to insure the release of an innocent prisoner, and pays little attention to
postrelease rehabilitation.
In the area of foreign and comparative law, much more has been written on the
responsibility of the government for injuries caused to its citizens through the normal
operation of governmental activities. On the specific problem of erroneous confinements, see Bratholm, Compensation of Persons Wrongfully Accused or Convicted in
Norway, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 833 (1961). For a more generalized examination of
foreign governmental responsibility for injuries caused by normal governmental
activities, see authorities cited note 138 infra.
Most general commentary in recent years on governmental liability has been
concerned essentially with fault-based tort liability, not with strict or absolute liability.
See authorities cited notes 61 & 96 infra.
13 Professor Borchard's outstanding writings on compensation of persons erroneously confined include (in chronological order) : Borchard, EuropeanSystems of State
Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 3 J. CRmm. L.C. 684 (1913); Borchard,
Governmental Liability [Responsibility] in Tort, 34 Y.LE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924),
36 YALE LJ. 1, 757, 1039 (1926), 28 CoLum. L. REv. 577, 734 (1928) (this was
Borchard's eight-part treatise) ; E. BORCHARD, supranote 3; Borchard, State Indemnity
for Errors of Criminal Justice, 21 B.U.L. REv. 201 (1941).
14 Professor Borchard attempted to set forth two separate theories to justify
compensation. The first was the "eminent domain" theory wherein the taking of an
individual's freedom for the preservation of peace through the administration of the
criminal law is analogized to the taking of property for a public use. "Eminent
domain," however, was apparently not used in the strict constitutional sense. Thus
the theory seems to have intended a persuasive impact upon legislatures rather than a
mandatory effect, although the term has been used by Borchard in such a context as
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thesis raises a specter of technical obstacles to recovery obfuscating the
more immediate issue of redress."
I. SOURCES OF ERROR: THE STATE'S RESPONSIBILITY
Erroneous confinements result most frequently from criminal proceedings. Precise empirical data is lacking; there is no way of knowing
how many confinements were or are the product of error. Examination
of various situations conducive to erroneous confinement, however, may
help to identify the scope of the problem.
The largest number of erroneous criminal incarcerations results
from erroneous arrests."6
Participating agencies in 1968 reported
1,047,220 arrests for major (index) offenses; 1 7 of court prosecutions
stemming from these arrests, a significant portion resulted in acquittal
or dropped charges.' 8 Undoubtedly some and possibly many of these
cases of acquittal or dropped charges represent erroneous confinements.' 9
might imply either meaning. See text accompanying note 163 infra ("eminent domain"
in the nonconstitutional sense); Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal
Justice, 21 B.U.L. REv. 201, 207 (1941) (implying what might be the constitutional
argument, though still probably used only for its persuasive effect by way of analogy).
The second theory, which might be called the strict liability theory, or as Professor
Borchard would call it, the "social welfare" theory, implies that when any great
undertaking, such as the administration of the crimihal laws, results in error, those
who derive the benefit of such an undertaking-society in general-should share the
loss incurred by the victim of that error. Id. 208.
Both foregoing theories involve a quid pro quo whereby the state would offer
compensation in exchange for a necessary deprivation of the freedom of certain
men-necessary to the extent that errors are an inherent part of the system. It is
irrelevant whether one speaks in terms of the "risk" of erroneous confinement, or of
the act of confinement as a "taking." The transaction would be the same regardless
of the terminology--erroneous loss of freedom traded for compensation.
16 The theory of "eminent domain" often connotes a constitutional mandate to
compensate. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. A theory of compensation resting
upon a constitutional basis encounters substantial problems, not the least of which is
the almost complete absence of precedent to support application of such a theory to
erroneous confinements. This is due in part to restrictive definitions of "property" for
eminent domain purposes and the notion that the government should receive tangible
benefit from the taking. See Note, supra note 12, at 1627. See generally Comment,
Traps for the Unwary-The Problems in Seeking Injunctive or Monetary Relief
from an Uncompensated Taking by the Federal Government, 46 NEB. L. REv. 816
(1967).
Failure to discuss a constitutional basis mandating compensation for erroneous
confinements is not intended as a final rejection of such an argument. Indeed, those
persons erroneously confined might allay the fear of unrestricted liability by providing
the courts with a sufficiently well-defined class of plaintiffs and thus inspire serious
consideration of a constitutionally based ground for compensation.
'I See Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 152. 154
(1953) (estimates several million illegal arrests annually) ; Warner, Investigating the
Law of Arrest, 26 A.B.A.J. 151 (1940).
17 U.S. FED. BUR. OF INVESTIGATION, 1968 UNiFORm CassE REPORTS 109-148. The

statistics that follow are based upon the reports of 4,812 agencies representing an
estimated 145,306,000 in population. See id. Table 22. at 110. Index offenses include
criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and
auto theft. Id. 57.
18 Of the total arrests reported for index offenses, 369,703 were adults. Id. 117,
118 (by subtraction of offenses). Of these, 88% were prosecuted in the courts and
of those so prosecuted 28% were either acquitted or their charges dropped. Id. 34, 35.
11Persons confined before trial and later acquitted (or whose charges are dropped)
may not be victims of erroneous confinements (for compensatory purposes) because
although the state could not gain a conviction or elected not to prosecute, they may
have in fact committed the offense charged and thus deserve no redress.
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The most serious and best known2 0 cases of erroneous confinement
result from the conviction of the innocent." Some of the more common
factors known to have been responsible for persuading the finder of
fact of the guilt of an innocent man include misidentification,

evidence, 23

2

circum-

4

stantial
frame-ups, overzealous police or prosecutors,
prior convictions or unsavory records, 261 community opinion demanding
a conviction,27 and unreliability of expert evidence.2 ' In addition,
erroneous convictions result from guilty pleas and confessions by
innocent persons,' or from the use of a false alibi by an innocent
accusedY0
A wide assortment of procedural errors violate constitutional
guarantees to a fair trial and thus may support the overturning of a
conviction by habeas corpus or other postconviction remedy. 31 These
constitutional errors usually focus upon the fairness of the trial; thus
release does not prove innocence, but simply that the conviction was
constitutionally unacceptable. Nonetheless, constitutional errors may
be a significant cause of convictions of individuals in fact innocent.
Other erroneous confinements are related to criminal proceedings
yet are not literally the result of convicting the innocent. A law upon
which a conviction is based may be subsequently repealed or declared
invalid, raising the question whether the confinement should be deemed
erroneous for purposes of compensation.32 Pretrial detention of wit20 For case histories of notable examples, see E. BORcHARD, supra note 3.
21 The term "not guilty" for criminal law purposes may hold a significantly
different import from the term "innocent" in a compensatory scheme. The release of
a prisoner either before or after trial may reflect a determination that the prisoner
did not in fact commit the crime charged; but it also may mean that there was merely
insufficient proof for a conviction, although as a matter of probability one could
reasonably conclude that the defendant had committed the offense. However, the
term "innocent" for compensatory purposes requires either a finding that the prisoner
did not in fact commit the crime, or a high degree of probability that such is the case.
22For examples of the operation of this type of error, see E. BoRcHARD, supra note
3, at xxv n.l. In one case, 17 witnesses mistakenly "identified" the wrong man. Id. 3.
2
Id. xxv nn.9-13.
24
Id. xxvi n.15.
25 Id. xxvi nn.17 (police) & 20 (prosecutors).
2
s Id. xxvi n21.
2
71d.
2

xxvi n.25.
8 Id. xxvii n.31.
29 Myhre, Conviction Without Trial in the United States and Norway: A
Comparison, 5 HouSToN L. REv. 647 (1968). This phenomenon has received the
following explanation:
For some, the drive for publicity may lead to a "confession"; others may
be ridden by a pathological guilt complex; and in other instances the "confession" may be prompted by a wish to cover up another crime or to shield
a friend or relative The practice of offering leniency for guilty pleas has
created an additional factor of uncertainty, as there is some risk that an
innocent person may plead guilty rather than risk a higher penalty should
he be convicted.
Id. 651 (footnotes omitted).
80 E. BoRcHA"R,
supra note 3, at xxvii n.38.
31 For a concise checklist of constitutional contentions often asserted in habeas
corpus proceedings, see P, SOKOL, FE-DERAL HABASs CoRus 341-43 (2d ed. 1969).
32 See Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statte in the Law of Public

Offlcers: Liability of Officer for Action or Nonaction, 77 U. PA. L. REnv. 155 (1928).
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nesses 33 and errors in computing a prisoner's sentence 34 also provide
possibilities for mistaken incarceration.
Erroneous confinements resulting from civil commitment proceedings may occur when an individual's mental deficiencies (apart from
those related to the use of alcohol or drugs) lead to involuntary,3"
temporary (protective),3' or voluntary 3 7 commitment to state mental
hospitals. Alcoholics and drug addicts are subject to commitment
under somewhat different standards.3" Even the most innocuous of
commitment procedures may lead to grievous consequences-such as
the detainment of a man who had voluntarily committed himself but was
unaware that requests for release were required in writing. 9
Remedies for erroneous confinements might be sought against the
government agent whose culpable 4 0 act precipitated the error-but this
33
3

See Comment, PretrialDetention of Witnesses, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 700 (1969).

4In one exceptional case, the prisoner was granted recovery for an error of parole

authorities in computing his sentence. White v. State, 199 Misc. 728, 101 N.Y.S2d
702 (1950).
35
E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-177 (1958); MIcH. COmP. LAWS ANN.
§ 330.18 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-66 (Supp. 1968); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 71.02240 (1962). For a treatment of some of the special risks involved in the
procedures for commitment following acquittal for reasons of insanity, see Greenwald,
Disposition of the Insane Defendant After "Acquittal"--The Long Road From
Commitment to Release, 59 J. CRIm. L. & Cir. 583 (1968) ; Comment, supra note 10.
36E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-178, 17-183 (Supp. 1969); MicE. Comp.
LAWS ANN. § 330.19 (Supp. 1969) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-69 (Supp. 1968) ; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §71.03.040 (1962).
37 Many statutes provide for periods of varying lengths of confinement after the
patient has requested release, and thus may result in the involuntary confinement of a
person after his initial willing commitment. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 86
(Supp. 1969) (involuntary confinement for up to 3 days after request for release);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-65, 37.1-79 (Supp. 1968) (patient should be released within
15 days of request, but may at the superintendent's direction be retained for further
treatment on an involuntary basis). Even a voluntary commitment statute providing
that the patient is free to leave at any time after admission may lead to an erroneous
confinement if the patient is not informed of the requisite procedures for release. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-187 (Supp. 1969) ; ef. Roberts v. Paine, 124 Conn. 170,
199 A. 112 (1938).
3
8 Statutes for involuntary confinement of drug addicts are not unusual. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-185 (1960) ; MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 330.18 (1967) ;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 72.48.030 (1962). Some statutes provide for a voluntary
commitment including a period of involuntary confinement following the inmate's
request for release. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 306 (McKinney Supp.
1969) (10 days); PA. STAT. tit. 50, §§2063(a) (1), 2067(a), 4403 (1969) (10 days).
Provisions are also made for emergency detentions of drug users.

E.g., PA. STAT.

tit. 50, § 4405 (1969). Statutory provisions for involuntary commitment of alcoholics
are not as common as those for mental defectives nor for drug addicts, but they do
exist in some jurisdictions. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 62 (Supp. 1969). Some
statutes authorize voluntary confinement followed by the usual specified period when
the inmate may be involuntarily held. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.96.100
(1962) (any voluntary inmate adjudicated incompetent may be confined for up to 120
days following his written request for release).
Statutes commonly provide for the temporary care (confinement) of both drug
users and alcoholics. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 80 (1965).

39 See Roberts v. Paine, 124 Conn. 170, 199 A. 112 (1938). The former patient
sued the hospital to recover damages for false imprisonment. Upholding a verdict for
the hospital, the court noted: "The finding is barren of any facts other than that the
plaintiff made known to the officers of the [hospital] his desire to leave, and this in

itself is not enough to impose upon it the duty to inform him as to the method he
should follow to secure his release." Id. at 176, 199 A. at 115.
40 Culpability as used here refers either to the presence of some fault actionable
in tort or to the unconstitutionality of the official's act.
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approach is untenable for several reasons. First, error may flaw a
criminal or civil proceeding and no one be at fault. Thus, if compensation is to wait on culpable acts giving rise to a cause of action in tort
for damages, many erroneous confinements will go unremedied.
Second, as will be discussed, 4 damage suits against government agents
often face nearly insuperable obstacles.
The culpability of the agent causing the confinement does not alter
the essential injury of the innocent prisoner: the fact and extent of the
injury should be of controlling significance rather than the degree of
fault of the government agent. Not the agent, but the government
itself, justifying the mistaken exertion of power over the individual,
should redress the injury. Were the erroneous confinement exclusively
the result of fortuity, or even of the acts of private citizens, then the
government's obligation would appear gratuitous and might be likened
to its obligation to compensate victims of crime.42 But an erroneous
confinement from the point of view of the government is more accurately characterized as a quid pro quo.4 Any system providing for
confinement is only as perfect as those who design and operate it. Certainly it is more important that there be an imperfect system, with its
inherent risks of hardship, than that no system exist and the community be left unprotected from lawlessness.'
But the privilege embodied in the license to operate an imperfect system should not be
absolute. In reference to the criminal law system, Professor Borchard
stated :
[I]n the operation of any great undertaking, such as the
management of a large industry or the administration of the
criminal law, there are bound to be a number of accidents
...
. Where the common interest is joined for a common
end-maintaining the public peace by the prosecution of
crime-each individual member being subject to the same
danger (erroneous conviction), the loss when it occurs should
be borne by the community as a whole and not by the injured
individual alone.4 5
Liability for erroneous confinements-"special sacrifices" 46 demanded
by the government of its citizens, who acquiesce in the use of an
41 Notes
42

59-95 infra & accompanying text.
See Cameron, Compensation for Victims of Crime:The New Zealand Experiinent, 12 J. PuB. L. 367, 370 (1963) (compensation an act of charity justified by a
sense of obligation toward the victim) ; Childres, supra note 7, at 457 (compensation
necessary because many people cannot afford private insurance).
43 See note 14 supra.
44 See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. Rtv.
263, 269 (1937).
45 Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 21 B.U.L. REv. 201,
208 4(1941).
6
Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 28 CoLUm. L. Rzv.
734, 774 (1928) :
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imperfect instrumentality-should be imposed upon the government not
because it was at fault by conventional standards but as a matter of
social adjustment.4 7
Although the immediate problem of incarceration is obviously
ended by the prisoner's release, freedom from imprisonment is inadequate compensation and does not satisfy the government's liability.
Release simply reverses the course of the tragedy; it does nothing to
repair the damage. The liability should be satisfied by monetary compensation. Substantial legal 48 as well as social adjustments must be
made to effect a satisfactory return to the community; financial resources available upon release to an average prisoner from the government have been estimated to vary from sixteen to one hundred and
twenty dollars. 9 One-third of federal prisoners polled had no employment during the first month following their release,1"° and the median
cash income for the first month was eighty dollars.
Remarkably, less than ten percent of the former prisoners ascribed
their difficulty in acquiring employment to their criminal record. 2 This
indicates that expungement of the criminal record of persons erroneously confined may not alleviate their difficulties in securing adequate
employment. An individual forced to forfeit a normally vital and
productive period of his life is retarded in his personal, economic, and
social progress as compared with his peers. The significance of this
disparity cannot be underestimated. Obviously the severity of the loss
relates directly to the length of the erroneous confinement. But even
a relatively short confinement cannot be ignored: as one commentator
has said:
[N]o exercise of state power is more feared than interference
with the freedom to come and go; and particularly when the
detention is deliberate the law's concern with remedial action
is great.; 3
More specifically, unwilling confinement has been described as "the
most serious deprivation of individual liberty that a society may
[S]pecial sacrifices imposed upon or borne by the individual in the pursuit
of the common aim, the administration of the public service, should be spread
over the community as a whole instead of resting . . . solely upon the

injured individual.
47 W. PiOSSER, THE LAW or TORTS 509 (3rd ed. 1964) ; see Pound, The End of
Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARv.L. REV. 195, 233 (1914).
4
8 See, e.g., Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction awd Their
Removal: A Comparative Study, 59 J. CRb. L.C. & P.S. 347, 349 (1968). The
article recognizes problem areas facing the former prisoner concerning political
activity, standing in the community, public office and professional standing, contracts,
military matters, and participation in the administraton of justice.
49 D.GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE
50
Id.328.
5

SysTEm 319 (1964).

1Id. 333. Three-eighths of a typical postrelease panel had median debts of $470.

Id. 341.
5 Id.356.
-3 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL

OF

ADmINISTRATIVE ACTION

250 (1965).

1098

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.118:1091

impose." 4 Certainly monetary compensation cannot restore the individual to his original position before the erroneous confinement, but it
is the most practical means of aiding him to recoup his time and
opportunity losses.
Although not a new concept,55 strict governmental liability, as the
doctrine espoused here is commonly known, has received little application in the area of erroneous confinements. Yet it is more effective
than the other two remedial schemes-fault-based tort liability and
private bills granting compensation through special legislation-offering
either actual or potential governmental compensation. The goal for
the remainder of this Comment is to examine these remedies in terms
of their effectiveness as a means of compensating victims of erroneous
confinement.

IL. REMEDIES
A. Fault-based Governmental Tort Liability
The first drawback to a fault-based system of liability in tort is
that it must both compensate and admonish."8 This often results in
what has been termed the "mutual hampering effect" of the attempt "to
compensate the plaintiff for one set of reasons, and to punish the
defendant for an entirely different set of reasons . . . . ,, 7 The
practical result is to diminish the availability of the tort remedy when
the extent of the tortfeasor's fault and his victim's injury are significantly out of joint. Even where the "mutual hampering effect" does
not foreclose a remedy, "it can only be thru the sheerest accident that
the sum which will make the plaintiff whole will also happen to be the
proper penalty to bring about the reform of the defendant and act as
a deterrent to others." "' Thus, both objectives are often distorted in
accommodation, thereby stifling compensatory relief.
Litigation to redress an erroneous confinement may take the form
of a suit either against the official proximately causing the confinement,
or against the responsible government.59 The following discussion
analyzes the difficulties with both approaches.
54 Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment,

117 U. PA. L. REv. 75 (1968).
-5 For an explication of some of the fundamental theories underlying the basic
notion of strict governmental liability, see Borchard, Theories of Governmental
Responsibility in Tort, 28 CoLum. L. REv. 734, 742-72 (1928).
56A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 84 (1951).
57 Morris, Rough Justice and Some Utopian Ideas, 24 ILL. L. REv. 730, 733 (1930).
58 Id.
59 In actions for damages, whether or not a suit is against the state (as opposed
to the individual official) depends upon whether "the judgment sought would expend
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration."
Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947) ; accord, Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620
(1963).
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1. Suits Against Government Officials
The most formidable obstacle to relief facing a victim of erroneous
confinement derives from the doctrine of sovereign immunity. As a
general proposition, the government may not be sued without its consent.6 ° This immunity has been applied to certain government officials,'- first to judicial officers and later to other officials exercising a
discretionary function.2
The immunity of select government officials from suit has been
said to be designed to assure their freedom "to exercise their duties
unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits" so that they might carry
out the "fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of
government." 6 First, the mantle of immunity will cover an official
so long as he acts within the scope of his authority," a phrase encompassing all but the most private of activities; that is, those which
look to the state for none of their efficacy.65 Second, immunity is
granted federal and state officials 66 whose activities require an exercise
of discretion 0 7---the boundaries of which may frequently define the
official's scope of authority.
60
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882) (dictum); Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
269, 275 (1868).
61See 3 K. DAvis, ADmixismavE LAw TA TisE §§26.01-26.07 (1958); F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 29.8-29.10, 29.11029.15 (1956) ; L. JAFFE,
supra note 53, at 213-60; W. PaossEm, supra note 47, at 1013-19.
62 3 K. DAVIs, supra note 61, at § 26.01.
63 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959) (governmental immunity as absolute
defense to libel action against federal executive officer) ; see Booth v. Fletcher, 101
F2d 676, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 628 (1939).
04E.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871); Norton v.
McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2 Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
65 Chief Judge Learned Hand has said of the scope of authority:
What is meant by saying that the officer must be acting within his power
cannot be more than that the occasion must be such as would have justified
the act, if he had been using his power for any of the purposes on whose
account it was vested in him.
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
00 With few exceptions, distinctions between federal and state precedent in this
area are insignificant. Professor Jaffe has written:
[N]o distinction has ever been explicitly recognized in the cases between
suits against state and against federal officers, since rationalization has
proceeded in terms of an abstract sovereign equally applicable to both
types of case.
L. JAFFE, slpra note 53, at 216-17.
6 See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571-78 (1959) (Acting Director of the
Office of Rent Stabilization); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 859-62 (5th Cir.
1964) (first assistant to the Assistant Attorney General and a Deputy U.S. Marshall) ;
Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714, 716-17 (9th Cir. 1961) (a district director and
collection officer of the Internal Revenue Service) ; L. JAFFE, supra note 53, at 240-47.
In Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963), Judge Medina referred to discretionary-based immunity,
saying:
There is no litmus paper test to distinguish acts of discretion . . . and to
require a finding of "discretion" would merely postpone, for one step in the
process of reasoning, the determination of the real question-is the act
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The most important class of immune officials is composed of the
judiciary.18 (Exceptions to immunity arise on those infrequent occasions when a judicial officer acts wholly without jurisdiction. 9 )
Judicial immunity of judges often forecloses relief in actions for tortious
confinements because judicial activity is often the proximate cause of
the incarceration. The extension of immunity to quasi-judicial officers, 70 especially prosecutors, 71 has further reduced the likelihood of
relief. Finally, immunity has been granted to judicial and quasi-judicial
officers in suits brought under the Civil Rights Act " as well.
The doctrine of official immunity, while not totally consistent in
its application, has prevented many victims of clearly invalid confinements from obtaining relief. It has been held, for example, that no
action will lie against the judge in favor of men incarcerated as a result
of erroneous procedures,7 for errors in judgment resulting in improper
detention after arrest, 74 for mistakes concerning the weight of the
evidence presented,7 5 nor for erroneous inferences drawn from testicomplained of the result of a judgment or decision which it is necessary that
the Government official be free to make without fear or threat of vexatious
or fictitious suits and alleged personal lability?
68 See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347-54 (1871) ; Holland
v. Lutz, 194 Kan. 712, 715-16, 401 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1965) ; DeWitt v. Thompson, 192
Miss. 615, 625, 7 So. 2d 529, 531 (1942) ; Moore v. Cotton, 94 N.H. 387, 388, 54 A.2d
167, 168 (1947). See generally Thompson, .udicial Immunity and the Protection of
Justices, 21 MOD. L. REv. 517 (1958).
19 See, e.g., Farish v. Smoot, 58 So. 2d 534, 537-38 (Fla. 1952) (judge liable for
ordering arrest of prisoner who was released on a valid habeas corpus petition);
Vickrey v. Dunivan, 59 N.M. 90, 94, 279 P.2d 853, 855 (1955) (conviction for conduct
not prohibited by municipality's ordinance) ; McKelvey v. Marsh, 63 App. Div. 396,
400, 71 N.Y.S. 541, 543 (1901) (city magistrate issued warrant on clearly insufficient
information); Kaptur v. Kaptur, 50 Ohio App. 91, 93, 197 N.E. 496, 497 (1934)
(complaint set forth no charge of the commission of a crime). Even this rare exception to judicial immunity has been qualified by decisions holding it insufficient to
deprive a judge of immunity simply because his acts constituted an excessive or
erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, e.g., Holland v. Lutz, 194 Kan. 712, 717-18, 401 P.2d
1015, 1021 (1965), or involved the decision that he had jurisdiction when in fact he
had none, Tedford v. McWhorter, 373 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
Furthermore, even in the exceptional cases when a judge is held not immune,
he will probably prevail in the litigation. Referring to a hypothetical judge-defendant,
Professor Jaffe has written:
Neither he, himself, nor a later tribunal will be inclined to characterize his
action as arbitrary. The judge's protection is in part a reflection of his
exalted station, in part the complement of the fact that the individual has
effective protection in the procedure and formalities of the judicial system.
L. JAFFE, spra note 53. at 242.
70 See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-76 (1959) ; L. JAFFE, supra note 53,
at 242-43.
7' See, e.g., Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 404-06 (1926), af'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927)
(per curiam); Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868, 869 (9th Cir. 1964); Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
72
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-58 (1967) (judges immune, and the
defense of good faith and probable cause available to policemen in actions under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964)). See also L. JAFFE, supra note 53, at 242-43.
73 DeWitt v. Thompson, 192 Miss. 615, 625, 7 So. 2d 529, 531 (1942); Stahl
v. Currey, 135 Ohio St. 253, 258-62, 20 N.E2d 529, 532-33 (1939).
74 Comstock v. Eagleton, 11 Okla. 487, 494-95, 69 P. 955, 957 (1902), appeal dismissed, 196 U.S. 99 (1905) (no cause of action although judge exceeded his authority).
75 Johnson v. Morton, 94 Mich. 1, 5-6, 53 N.W. 816, 817 (1892).
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mony.76 In Broom v. Douglas, 77 a justice of the peace was held immune from suit notwithstanding his issuance of an arrest warrant on
78
the basis of an affidavit wholly insufficient to charge a criminal offense.
An error not strictly part of the judicial procedure does not remove
the immunity. In Bujaki v. Egan,"9 for example, no damages were
awarded when a prisoner was not freed because the release order from
the judge was not communicated to the jailor.
The relevance of official immunity may depend to an extent on
the nature of the cause of action. Suits to redress erroneous confinements are usually brought under two tort theories. The first, false
imprisonment, refers to an arrest or confinement without legal authority, the essence of the tort being "the perversion of proper legal
procedure." 80 The second, malicious prosecution, focuses on the
motives of the defendant in using his authority to effect the confinement
when the process or use of authority is otherwise valid."1 Against
police officers, the largest class of officials without nearly absolute immunity, false imprisonment will usually be a valid cause of action, 2 but
This pattern is also
actions for malicious prosecutions often fail.'
76 Marks v. Sullivan, 9 Utah 12, 17-18, 33 P. 224, 225-26 (1893) (magistrate
issued defective warrant based on affidavit).
77 175 Ala. 268, 57 So. 860 (1912).
78 Id. at 283, 57 So. at 865. The case of Gibson v. Reynolds, 172 F.2d 95 (8th
Cir. 1949), offers another example of quasi-judicial immunity. Here, plaintiff's
"desertion" following an improper draft classification led to his arrest and an
erroneous confinement. His suit failed because members of the local draft board
were held immune. See Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951) (immigration officials held immune from suit by
alien who allegedly was erroneously detained aboard ship).
79 237 F. Supp. 822 (D. Alas. 1965).
80 W. PRossER, supra note 47, at 853.
81 Id.
82
See, e.g., Craig v. Cox, 171 A.2d 259, 262 (D.C. Mun. Ct. of App. 1961),
aff'd, 304 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Boies v. Raynor, 89 Ariz. 257, 260, 361 P.2d
1, 3 (1961); Ulibarri v. Maestas, 74 N.M. 517, 520-21, 395 P.2d 238, 240 (1964);
Kilcup v. McManeus, 64 Wash. 2d 771, 777-78, 394 P.2d 375, 379 (1964).
83 The authorities on the amenability of police officers to suit for malicious
prosecution appear divided, with the law developing in favor of extension of the
immunity to the police in this area. For cases favoring police immunity, see Springfield v. Carter, 175 F.2d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 1949) (building inspector) ; Laughlin v.
Garnett, 78 App. D.C. 194, 138 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
738 (1944) (police); Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 321-23, 239 P.23 876,
879-81 (1952); White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 729-33, 235 P.2d 209, 211-214
(1951) (fish and game investigator); Dawson v. Martin, 150 Cal. App. 2d 379,
382-83, 309 P.2d 915, 917-18 (1957) (fire and building inspector) ; Bromund v. Holt,
24 Wis. 2d 336, 341-46, 129 N.W.2d 149, 152-55 (1964) (police and pathologist
employed by coroner). See also W. PRossER, supra note 47, at 856; Annot., 28
A.L.R.2d 646, 649 (1953).
Cases holding law enforcement officers liable for malicious prosecution include:
Motley v. Dugan, 191 S.W.2d 979, 981-82 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1945) (township
constable); Earl v. Winne, 14 NJ. 119, 132-35, 101 A.2d 535, 542-44 (1953)
(detectives); Vesey v. Connally, 112 Ohio App. 225, 226, 175 N.E.2d 876, 877
(1960) (police); Atkinson v. Burmingham, 44 R.I. 123, 127, 116 A. 205, 207, 36
A.L.R. 366, 369 (1922) (police chief); Kidd v. Reynolds, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 355, 358,
50 S.W. 600, 601 (1899) (town marshall). See also Note, Torts-MaliciousProsecution-Public Officers, 32 N.C.L. REv. 360, 364-66 (1954).
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found in suits brought under the Civil Rights Act.84
Monroe v. Pape 15 made clear that the Civil Rights Act 8 6 "should
be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." 87 At least
one commentator has suggested that the common law remedies and
the Civil Rights Act damage remedies are becoming coterminous."8
The Supreme Court, however, recently held that the common law immunities of judicial and quasi-judicial officers continue under the Civil
Rights Act,89 as do many of the common law defenses such as good
faith and probable cause in false imprisonment actions against police
officers." Thus, although the Civil Rights Act provides a federal forum
and a constitutional nomenclature for private suits to redress erroneous
confinements, it remains questionable the extent, if any, to which police
are susceptible to suit, at least in the context of the usual erroneous
confinement situation.
Even if a victim of an erroneous confinement can find a nonimmune defendant and overcome such defenses as legal justification in
false imprisonment 1 or probable cause and the absence of malice in
malicious prosecution,' he may nonetheless find himself suing a
judgment-proof official.0 3 In addition, the cultural and economic background of many victims of erroneous confinement makes it unlikely that
they will be able to afford to bring suit or, once in court, that they
will elicit jury sympathy.Y
The tortious acts of officials cause only a portion of all erroneous
confinements. Many others, resulting from nontortious errors by
officials and the conduct of private parties, promise similarly slight
prospects for recovery. 5 In sum, even the few well-situated plaintiffs
84 On the availability of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), for providing relief for malicious prosecution, the courts are divided. Compare Curry v.
Ragan, 257 F.2d 449, 450 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 851, rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 914 (1958) (no action available for malicious prosecution),
and Bradford v. Lefkowitz, 240 F. Supp. 969, 974-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (no cause of
action), with Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 122-26 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied,
319 F.2d 839 (1963) (per curiam), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1964) (malicious
prosecution constitutes violation of civil rights provisions).
85 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
86 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
87 365 U.S. at 187.
88 See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond,
60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277, 320-29 (1966).
S9 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).

90 Id. at 557.
91

See W. PROSSER, supranote 47, at 61.
859-68.
98 Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MiNe.
L. REv. 493, 499 (1955). The courts have held that the government does not have
a duty to exact a bond (on which injured persons might sue) from a police officer.
92 Id.

W. PROSSER, supra note 47, at 1006.
94 Foote, supra note 93, at 500.
95 For example, the testimony of a witness in a prior criminal proceeding may
not be admissible in a subsequent action against the witness for malicious prosecution.
See Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1119, 1124-25 (1932).
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in suits against government officials must anticipate substantial obstruction along the path to adequate relief for erroneous confinement.
2. Suits Against the State
The prospects for recovery directly from the government for the
actionable wrongs of its agents are not significantly more encouraging.
Sovereign immunity,9 6 a judicially created concept ' appearing in the
federal and some state constitutions,9 is the initial, and in some jurisdictions insuperable, barrier to redress. Although governmental liability for erroneous confinements is foreclosed when the immunity is
absolute,9" some jurisdictions have partially waived their immunity,
providing a potential for redress.
Waiver of sovereign immunity has been accomplished through
both judicial abrogation and legislative waiver.""0 Largely as a result
of judicial abrogation, sovereign immunity has been described as "on
the run." 101 During the period 1957-65, judicial action alone in
thirteen jurisdictions opened large areas once immune from suit."'2
In most cases judicial abrogation simply presages subsequent legislation defining the new liability.' °3
0

6See generally 3 K. DAvis, supra note 61, at §§ 25.01-25.17; 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, supra note 61, at §§ 29.1-29.7, 29.11-29.15; L. JAFFE, Mupra note 53, at
213-60; W. PROSSER, supranote 47, at 996-1013.
D7 3 K. DAvis, mupra note 61, § 25.01.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XI, provides that no state may be sued by a citizen
of another state in federal court. State constitutions containing such provisions
typically provide that the state shall never be made a defendant in any court of law
or equity. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14; ARK. CoxST. art. V, § 20; ILL. CONST.
art.IV, § 26; W. VA. COxST. art. VI, § 35.
19 Until recently, more than half the states were at most occasionally responsible for their torts, and in several of those jurisdictions responsibility was almost
never undertaken. See Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 1363, 1407 (1954). Political subdivisions within the state are also generally immune. See 2 F. H.ARPE & F. JAMES, supra note 61, at § 29.11,
100 For the purpose of this section on fault-based tort liability, only certain
legislative action is relevant. Generally, governmental responsibility for injuries
caused by its agents may be based on the following types of legislative action:
(1) Legislation creating in the courts a right of action against the state. (2) Legislation creating a right to have the courts or another body recommend to the legislature that it pass private relief bills on particular occasions or legislation delegating
to an administrative agency the duty to hear claims. This type of legislation takes
two forms: (a) It may be used as a device to avoid state constitutional provisions
that proscribe suits against the state. Legislative approval of damage awards here
would be a mere formality after the initial enactment; and (b) It may result in an
actual exercise of legislative discretion in making awards in response to judicial or
agency recommendations. (3) Legislation in the form of private bills which are
the result of relatively independent legislative discretion. See 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, supra note 61, at § 29.4 n.3; Leflar & Kantrowitz, mtpra note 99, at 1407-08.
Types (1) and (2) (a) are within the area of fault-based tort liability, while discussion
of types (2) (b) and (3) is properly reserved for the analysis of private bills.
1013 K. DAvis, smpra note 61, at § 25.1 (Supp. 1965).
102

Id.

See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus,
10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 463, 463-72 (1963) ; Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability:
Judicial Lawnmaking in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAix. L. REv. 163, 163-65, 178-79
103

(1963).
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Despite statutory waiver, nearly all aspects of official immunity
frustrating actions against officials likewise impair the compensatory
potential of action against the state. Even after the state has generally
waived immunity, the various immunities protecting officials from suit
are often assimilated into the concept of governmental liability. Thus
the government is often immune from suit whenever the acting official
would be immune. For example, New York has waived its immunity
from suit, but refuses, on the basis of official immunity, to accept
liability for the acts of its judicial officers. 10 4 At least one court has
said that government immunity is identified with official immunity
because the policy considerations in each case are similar: that is,
public officials may fail to pursue their duties vigorously if they must
0
worry that their actions may lead to liability of their employer.0'
In
addition, statutes making the government liable for the torts of its
agents commonly except cases in which officials have exercised a
"discretionary" function.0" Thus recovery is foreclosed in most suits
against the state for tortious erroneous confinement because the culpable
conduct of judicial and quasi-judicial officials is not actionable.
The most striking vestige of official liability law in governmental
liability is its fault-based nature. Many state statutes,30 7 as well as the
Federal Tort Claims Act,' limit governmental liability solely to redressing injury caused by what would otherwise have been an actionable wrong if done by a private individual. Thus the plaintiff encounters difficulties and expense in proving fault and proximate cause
similar to those experienced by plaintiffs in actions against private
individuals. Furthermore, he must often attempt to analogize private
tort situations to acts peculiar to governmental functions, such as the
104See, e.g., Smith v. State, 26 App. Div. 2d 974, 274 N.Y.S2d 738 (1966)
(mem.) ; Cole v. State, 19 Misc. 2d 589, 196 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1959).
04
'
See Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 884-85, 410 P2d 606, 607-08
(1966).
106 Most of the statutes follow the provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. §2680(a) (1964), which excludes claims based upon "the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused:' For similar provisions in state statutes, see
ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250(1) (Cum. Supp. 1969); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West
1966); HAwAiI REv. LAWS §662-15(1) (1968); IowA CODE ANN. §25A.14(1)
(1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §466.03(6) (1963); NEv. REV. STAT. §41.032 (1965);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §895.43(3) (1966) (excluding injury caused by exercise of
judicial and quasi-judicial functions).
07
See HAwAII REV. STAT. § 662-2 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 1-204
(Smith-Hurd 1966) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 25A.2(4) (1967) ; NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.031
(1965); N.Y. JUDIcIARY-CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143-291 (Cum. Supp. 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 1967); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.090, 4,96.010 (Supp. 1969).
10828 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969); see Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1950) ; cf. United States v. Page, 350 F2d 28,
34 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979 (1966).
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power to arrest and imprison ""D or to call persons to military service.""
Even under the conditions most conducive to a tort action against the
state, governmental liability is nonetheless limited to fault; thus victims
of nonculpable erroneous confinements have no action in tort. And
even if fault is present, in some states the statutes expressly exclude
the government from liability for false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process -the torts most likely to
lead to erroneous confinements.-"'
As discussed above, two primary limitations on liability apply to
suits against officials. First, they are responsible only for their legally
culpable acts-that is, those performed beyond the scope of their
authority. And second, because "discretionary" activities immunize
officials from suit, they are not liable for those acts no matter how
culpable. Why these limitations on individual liability should be applied to governmental liability is not entirely clear.
Professor Jaffe suggests that application of official immunities to
the state presents no anomaly because "despite innumerable statements
to the contrary, the immunity is not in any realistic sense a device to
protect the officer, but rather . . . it expresses, even if subconsciously,
the conclusion that the plaintiff should not recover at all." "1 And,
because the immunities of the officer and of the state are nearly identical," 3 "the question of immunity has become and should become
basically whether in all the circumstances the plaintiff is entitled to
monetary relief." 11 Taken broadly, Professor Jaffe's statement leads
to the conclusion that, because the great majority of victims of erroneous confinement do not recover, the state has determined that they
are not worthy of compensation. Professor Jaffe himself, however,
would probably reject this conclusion in the case of erroneous confine109 Certainly the power to arrest and imprison is one of those activities
which is unique to a government. But it is not so unique as to justify the
invocation of sovereign immunity to give the government complete freedom
to make arrests, even careless ones.
Mikva, Sovereign Immunity: In a Democracy the Emperor Has No Clothes, 1966

U. ILL. L.F. 828, 839-40 (1966).
11On Small v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 659 (D. Del. 1963), the plaintiff,
erroneously called to military service, was denied relief under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964), because of the lack of a private analogy to that
exercise of governmental power.

111Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §2680(h) (1964); ALAsXA STAT.
§ 09.50.250(3) (Cum. Supp. 1969) ; CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 820.4, 856a (West 1966) (the
former section excludes claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, while the
latter excludes claims based upon determinations by officials of whether or not to
confine an individual for mental illness or drug addiction); HAwAII REv. STAT.
§ 662-15(4) (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 6-105 to 6-107 (Smith-Hurd 1966)
(excluding claims concerning determinations to commit the mentally ill and drug

addicts) ; IOwA CODE ANN. § 25A.14 (4) (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-10(2),
(5), (10) (Supp. 1967) (the last subsection excludes claims arising "out of the
incarceration of any person in any state prison, county, or city jail or other place
of legal confinement . . .").
112 L. JAFFE,

113 Id.
"14 Id.

supra note 53, at 235.
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ment, for he has admitted that the breadth of official privilege has been
tolerable only because, in cases of severe injury, the gravity of the
injury may override the presumption against recovery.1 5 Furthermore, he has recognized erroneous confinement as an injury exceptional

in its severity." 0
Perhaps the single fault-based system defining the individual
liability of government officers was transferred to define the scope of
governmental liability as a reflection of the appeal of an existing body
of tort law to the nascent field of governmental liability, or even of a
fixation with notions of fault pervading nearly the entire spectrum of
present-day tort law. Whatever the reason, the emerging law of
governmental liability inherited all the practical difficulties of reconciling the competing influences of deterrence, compensation, and other
rationales relevant to the proper scope of state liability" 7 within the
single remedial system of fault-based liability.
The most reasonable conclusion to draw from this failure to reach
the problem of erroneous confinement is not that the government has
decided that the injury is undeserving of compensation, but that the
government has determined that erroneous confinements should not be
redressed by a system of fault-based tort liability. And because nearly
all tort remedies are conceived within the system of fault-based liability,
the absence of a remedy there usually indicates that no remedy is
available. Recognizing this, Professor Ehrenzweig asked: "Why is it
that this struggle between an injurer's and the injured's law of torts
has, up to the present time, been fought within a law of fault liability ?" 118 In answer, he suggested a different approach:
[T]he fault theory has been maintained, I believe, as the
governing theory of tort law because the only alternative has
too often been seen in a rule of unrestricted liability for all

causation.
[S]trict liability for all causation is not the only alternative,
but . . . fault liability for harm foreseeably caused by reprehensible conduct can be, and as to enterprise risks has largely
been, replaced by a liability for "negligence [liability] without
fault" for harm typically caused by lawful conduct." 0
115 Id. 245.
116 Id.250.
117 Professor Van Alstyne offers six general policy considerations leading to
rationally different tort liability consequences of governmental action: (1) the degree
of fault in the governmental activity; (2) the degree of risk of harm from the
activity; (3) practical alternatives, if any, to liability; (4) the deterrent effect of

such liability; (5)

the degree of public asssumption of the risks of the activity; and

(6) the potentiality of such liability to act as a deterrent to, or interference with,

socially desirable governmental activities.

Van Alstyne, Governmental

Tort Lia-

bility: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 463, 472-532 (1963).
118 A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 56, at 13.
"19

Id. 14.
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Professor Ehrenzweig's suggestion does not envision a single remedial
system, but rather, employment of an additional system of liability
without fault if a recurring injury of a severe quality is typically caused
by unlawful conduct. The following sections consider remedies not
necessarily based upon the culpability of the official causing the
incarceration.
B. Private Bills in the Legislature
The legislature (federal or state) will often remedy a particular
injury by passing a private bill authorizing a special appropriation to
the injured individual. The remedy may take one of at least three
different forms, depending on the jurisdiction: (1) the legislature may
consider the claim directly; (2) claims may be presented to administrative authorities for recommendations or determinations before they
are presented to the legislature; and (3) the legislature may authorize
suits on a particular claim or authorize administrative determination of
the claim. 2 The common element is an ad hoc exercise of legislative
discretion in response to each claim.
A generation ago the private bill was reportedly the most prevalent
means of satisfying claims against the state.'
Today, with the demise
of sovereign immunity underway, the private bill is thought to serve
more of an interstitial function-to satisfy those "claims of conscience" 122 not remediable by available tort actions.
The private bill has several advantages over purely fault-based
tort liability, although the extent to which private bills express a policy
of strict liability is uncertain. 1 23 The merits of a claim may often be
judged in the light of existing but inapplicable tort law,' 24 yet the test

has been formulated according to whether the government "controlled
or was connected with the physical instrumentality through which
damage was done." 125 Thus, at the very least, private legislation is
not limited in all situations to redressing injury caused by wrongful
conduct. Neither must the legislature look exclusively to the rules of
private tort liability for guidance in deciding the effect of governmental
activities for which there may be no private analogue. And finally, the
costs of seeking relief through a private bill are1 26usually considerably
less than those incurred by prolonged litigation.
1203
12 1

K. DAvis, supra note 61, at § 25.02.

See Nutting, Legislative Practice Regarding Tort Claims Against the State,

4 Mo. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1939).
=22
Gellhorn &Lauer, CongressionalSettlement of Tort Claims Against the United
States, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 32 (1955).
1233 K. DAvis, supra note 61, at § 25.02.
124 Gellhorn & Lauer, supra note 122, at 13-14.
1- Gellhorn & Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29
N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1325, 1334 (1954).
126
See Note, Administration of Claims Against the Sovereignt--A Suervey of
State Techniques, 68 HARv. L. REv. 506, 509 (1955).
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Despite the preceding advantages, serious shortcomings in the
private bill remedy undermine its utility as a general solution to
remedial problems of erroneous incarcerations. To begin with, the
The reasons for disprocedure does not lead to uniform results."
crepancy are apparent: there is no appeal from legislative action; no
opinions are published reciting the reasons for the disposition of
claims and affording guidance for future actions; I2 and, in the federal
context, for example, the Subcommittee on Claims will not at present
reconsider a vetoed bill absent a material change of facts.' 2 9 Political
3
It has even
pressures may also contribute to the lack of uniformity."
been suggested that occasionally a President will veto an otherwise
worthy claim to induce Congress to enact pending general legislation
dealing with the subject of the grievance. 3 '
Apart from the lack of uniformity, legislative machinery is illequipped to give each of the many claims the investigative scrutiny or
the timely disposition a more regular system could offer. The record
of one Congress showed that eighty percent of the claims reaching
In one case, an
final judgment were more than four years old."
Indian boy who had lost his hand and forearm while attending a school
Affairs did not receive his comoperated by the Bureau of 3Indian
3

pensation for nineteen years.

Finally, the private bill is not available in many jurisdictions. In
fact, in at least a dozen states, the constitutions prohibit them, 3 4 usually
because they do not operate uniformly. 33
In response to the shortcomings of private bills, one writer
observed:
In the long run, emphasis upon general rather than private
laws will give larger assurance that the bulk of meritorious
claims will be satisfied.' 36
Victims of erroneous confinements provide a class of suitors sufficiently well-defined to justify general legislation. Examination of the
fault-based system of tort liability and of the private bill have led to
these conclusions: that at least in cases of severe injury, the advisable
27

See E. BORCHARD, supra note 3,at 169, 314.
See Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1684, 1686 (1966).
'M See id. 1693. Budget doubts expressed through the Bureau of the Budget
may well result in a veto. Id. 1692.
130 See Shumate, Tort Claims Against State Governments, 9 LAw & CONTEMP.
1

28

'

PROB. 242, 250-51 (1942).

See Gellhorn & Lauer, supra note 122, at 22-23.
Id. 31.
'33 Id. 30; see Claim of Mardin, Priv. L. No. 82-278, 65 Stat. 105 (1951).
134 3 K. DAvis, supra note 61, at §25.02 & n.19.
135 For examples of the various types of constitutional provisions designed to
secure uniformity of treatment by proscribing private bills, see Nutting, Mpra note 121,
at 16-17.
136 Gellhorn & Lauer, supra note 122, at 25.
'3'

32

1
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alternative to the former system is an action grounded in strict liability
for a select class of injured claimants, and that a general statute is
needed to avoid the uncertainties of the private bill. Statutorily imposed strict governmental liability will now be considered.
C. Strict Governmental Liability
The theory underlying strict governmental liability has already
been discussed.' 7 It can be summarized as follows:
[T]he avowed goal of the absolute liability approach is
allocation of loss to the party better equipped to pass it on
to the public: the superior riskbearer. .

.

. The policy . . .

should be one of transferring losses only when necessary to
achieve the overriding goal of proper loss allocation-when,
in other words, the shift is from an inferior to a superior
risk bearer. 3 8
The risk of severe harm caused by the lawful conduct of the
government's agents demands different treatment than is provided
under a fault-based system of tort liability."9 In addition, the existence of a cohesive class of claimants indicates the utility of a general
statute providing for absolute liability, rather than private legislation,
and avoids the risk of unrestricted liability for other actions.
Today, five jurisdictions-the federal government,' California, 141
Illinois,' 42 New York,' and Wisconsin ' 44 -have statutes providing
for the compensation of persons erroneously confined by the state, regardless of the culpability of its agents. Since redress is based upon
these statutes rather than upon any constitutional mandate, 145 they
present merely practical problems of interpretation, and the courts have
tended to read their provisions narrowly.
The most significant shortcoming of these statutes is their limited
scope. Without exception, they are limited to redressing confinements
137 See text accompanying notes 41-47 supra.
138 Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172,
1176 (1952). Strict governmental liability for government activities involving similar
risks of harm has become common in many European countries. See Bratholm, supra
note 12; Meyer, German Criminal Procedure: The Position of the Defendant if Court,
41 A.B.A.J. 592, 668 (1955) ; Pock, Systems of Public Responsibility in Switzerland,
Germany, and Austria, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 1023, 1029, 1051 (1966). See generally
Braband, Liability in Tort of the Government and Its Employees: A Comparative

Analysis with Emphasis on German Law, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 18 (1958); Hink,
Govermnental Liability for Risk Under French and German Law, 19 RUTGERS L. REV.
472 (1965); Hink, Service-Connected Versus Personal Fault in the French Law of
Government Tort Liability, 18 RuTGERS L. REv. 17 (1963); Jacoby, Federal Tort
Clains Act and French Law of Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study, 7
VAND. L. REv. 246 (1954).
39
'
See text accompanying

note 119 supra.
140 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (1964).
141 CAT_ PENAL. CODE § 4904 (Supp. 1970).
14 2

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960).
143 N.Y. JuDIcIRy LAw-CT. CL. AcT. § 9(3-a) (McKinney 1963).
44
1 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 285.05 (1958).

145 See, e.g., Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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arising out of criminal proceedings. Furthermore, redress is limited
to confinement following a conviction-a requirement that automatically
excludes all pretrial incarcerations. The California statute is restricted
to redress for confinement resulting from a mistaken felony conviction.14 6 Relief has even been withheld under the federal act where an
otherwise compensable "conviction" was extinguished by the reviewing
officer in a Court Martial proceeding. 4 '
The federal statute requires that a claimant obtain a certificate of
the court or pardon, indicating not only that the conviction has been
"reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty .
or that he has been pardoned upon the stated ground of innocence," " but also that he committed none of the acts charged 149
and his actions violated no other federal or state offenses. 5 0 Issuance
of the certificate of innocence has been held to be a matter of discretion
for the presiding judge, 5 ' and neither a charge dismissed nor a judgment of not guilty is alone enough to upset a judge's determination that
152
the claimant is not "innocent" and does not deserve the certificate.
The state statutes contain similar requirements, and innocence may be
required to be shown on the governor's pardon, 15 3 at a separate judicial
hearing," 4 or at an administrative proceeding.' 5 5
The burden of proving innocence in the compensation proceeding
has from the start been placed upon the claimant."; 6 The presumption
of innocence afforded to the defendant in a criminal proceeding is not
applicable in the subsequent statutory compensation proceeding.' 7 One
court has stated that, because the United States Supreme Court rarely
reverses on the facts, it should be presumed that the claimant committed
the acts charged.' 58 If a claimant is released on grounds of actual innocence, his burden is easily met. But if conviction is reversed on procedural grounds, the time elapsed between the original trial and the
release may not only leave the prosecutor with sparse evidence upon
which to base a new trial, but also similarly impede the claimant's
§ 4900 (Supp. 1970).
See Cox v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 494, 495-96 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
14828 U.S.C. § 2513(a) (1) (1964).
149 The claimant's elements of proof are increased by the requirement that his
acts "in connection with his charge" constitute no criminal offense under any jurisdiction. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 176, 179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 638-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
1-5028 U.S.C. §2513(a) (2) (1964).
151 E.g., Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F2d 70, 72-73 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
52
'
United States v. Brunner, 200 F2d 276, 279-80 (6th Cir. 1952) ; LeFevre v.
Goodland, 247 Wis. 512, 516, 19 N.W.2d 884, 885 (1945).
153N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW-CT. CL. AcT § 9(3-a) (McKinney 1963).
254 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960).
1 55
CAl.. PENAL CODE § 4903 (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 285.05(3) (1958).
156 E.g., United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1947);
LeFevre v. Goodland, 247 Wis. 512, 515-16, 19 N.W.2d 884, 885 (1945).
157See, e.g., LeFevre v. Goodland, 247 Wis. 512, 516, 19 N.W.2d 884, 885 (1945).
158 Sinclair v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 529, 531 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 974 (1953).
146 CAL. PENAL CODE
147
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attempt to prove his innocence. The point is that errors in past proceedings and a present evidentiary void should not fall upon the shoulders of
the claimant in his action for compensation, especially in view of the
greater factfinding resources of the government and the difficulty a
claimant faces in proving a negative: that he did not commit a certain
act. Of course, if the procedural error upon which the release is based
does not go to the guilt or innocence (or sanity, if a broader statute
were operable) of the claimant, nor to the fairness of the trial, the
burden of proof may more permissibly rest upon the claimant. Otherwise the state should accept the burden. The statute could lighten the
state's burden by making the record of the first trial admissible and
by calling for a preponderance-of-evidence standard rather than proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 9
Finally, the state might limit its liability by imposing a ceiling on
damages-an absolute upward limit as presently found in most statutes 160 or graduated ceilings based upon the number of years incarcerated, as in the liberal damage provisions of the Illinois statute.'61
A more liberal provision might limit recoverable damages to actual
pecuniary losses or a fixed multiple thereof.e
No matter what limitations the state may employ to restrict its
liability, even if its liability may no longer be technically absolute, the
strict liability statutes offer a considerably broader purview than existing fault-based systems and the private bill. Recognition by the legislature of the continuous obligation to compensate victims of erroneous
confinement, no matter how free from fault the government agents may
have been, represents an essential step forward.
CONCLUSION

More than forty years ago, Professor Borchard commented on
the government's gradual acceptance of tort liability based upon fault,
saying:
159Wis. STAT. ANN. §285.05(3) (1958), places the burden of proving his innocence upon the claimant and insists that it be satisfied "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
posing a nearly insurmountable obstacle to recovery in cases where reversal of the
conviction -was based upon procedural grounds.
160 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (1964) ($5,000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904
(Supp. 1970) ($10,000) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 285.05(4) (1958) ($5,000). The above
ceilings are conservative, and would not adequately compensate most losses suffered

from lengthy confinements. In Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 293, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486
(Ct. Cl. 1968), in an action against the state alleging negligence as the cause of an
erroneous confinement of about twelve years, the claimant was awarded $300,000 in
damages from the state.
161 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960) (5 years or less,

$15,000;
5 to 14 years, $30,000; over 14 years, $35,000).
62
_1 See 5 CALIF. LAW REvisOiN

COMM'N, SovEIGN IMMUNITY

STUDY 304

(1963), stating:
A rule of this type, for example, might authorize recovery of costs of medical
care and treatment, loss of earnings, impairment of earning capacity and increases in living expenses as a result of the injury sustained by plaintiff; but
it would restrict recovery of general damages for pain and suffering, embarrassment and humiliation, and other elements of a nonpecuniary nature . ...
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We ought to be quite content for the present with this
elemental reform, without asking for any such advance as
French law has made in looking to the resulting damage
rather than to the originating tort. The extreme view that
lawful and unlawful invasions of private right rest on the
same basis, even if sustainable, must be dismissed as impractical, if not dangerous to an initial reform looking to
the compensation of tortious injuries. It may well be, however, that with the education of public opinion to the essential
justice of compensating tortious injuries, our social outlook may become broadened to a point where legislatures in
enacting measures imposing extraordinary sacrifices on individuals will appreciate the desirability of distributing the
special burden among the people as a whole. Thus, police
power would assume a less confiscatory aspect and invasions
of private rights, now uncompensated,163would be acknowledged as incidents of eminent domain.

A generation and a half ago, it may have given cause to rejoice when
the state accepted any responsibility for the injurious acts of its agents,
even if the emphasis was misdirected toward the quality of the act and
as a result the nature of the injury became of secondary importance.
But today, enough years have passed and enough victims of erroneous
confinements have languished in prisons and asylums to have alerted
society to the exigency of compensating them. The inadequacies of
fault-based remedies and the uncertain private bills leave a statutory
scheme of strict governmental liability as the necessary solution.
Joseph H. King, Jr.
Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 28 COLUm. L. REv.
734, 772 (1928) (emphasis added). The reference to "eminent domain" does not
suggest a constitutional mandate compelling liability, but rather implies a voluntary
legislative acceptance of responsibility. See notes 14 & 15 supra & accompanying text.
163

